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ABSTRACT
A great quantity of user passwords nowadays has been
leaked through security breaches of user accounts. To en-
hance the security of the Password Authentication Protocol
(PAP) in such circumstance, Android app developers often
implement a complementary One-Time Password (OTP) au-
thentication by utilizing the short message service (SMS).
Unfortunately, SMS is not specially designed as a secure ser-
vice and thus an SMS One-Time Password is vulnerable to
many attacks. To check whether a wide variety of currently
used SMS OTP authentication protocols in Android apps
are properly implemented, this paper presents an empiri-
cal study against them. We first derive a set of rules from
RFC documents as the guide to implement secure SMS OTP
authentication protocol. Then we implement an automated
analysis system, AUTH-EYE, to check whether a real-world
OTP authentication scheme violates any of these rules. With-
out accessing server source code, AUTH-EYE executes An-
droid apps to trigger the OTP-relevant functionalities and
then analyzes the OTP implementations including those pro-
prietary ones. By only analyzing SMS responses, AUTH-EYE
is able to assess the conformance of those implementations
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for
personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not
made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear
this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components
of this work owned by others than ACMmust be honored. Abstracting with
credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to
redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request
permissions from permissions@acm.org.
ACSAC ’19, December 9–13, 2019, San Juan, PR, USA
© 2019 Association for Computing Machinery.
ACM ISBN 978-1-4503-7628-0/19/12. . . $15.00
https://doi.org/10.1145/3359789.3359828
to our recommended rules and identify the potentially inse-
cure apps. In our empirical study, AUTH-EYE analyzed 3,303
popular Android apps and found that 544 of them adopt
SMS OTP authentication. The further analysis of AUTH-EYE
demonstrated a far-from-optimistic status: the implementa-
tions of 536 (98.5%) out of the 544 apps violate at least one
of our defined rules. The results indicate that Android app
developers should seriously consider our discussed security
rules and violations so as to implement SMS OTP properly.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy → Software security engineer-
ing; Multi-factor authentication; Software reverse engineer-
ing;
KEYWORDS
Authentication Protocol; Mobile Application Security; One-
Time Password Authentication; Vulnerability Detection
ACM Reference Format:
Siqi Ma, Runhan Feng, Juanru Li, Yang Liu, Surya Nepal, Diethelm
Ostry, Elisa Bertino, Robert H. Deng, ZhuoMa, and Sanjay Jha. 2019.
An Empirical Study of SMS One-Time Password Authentication
in Android Apps. In 2019 Annual Computer Security Applications
Conference (ACSAC ’19), December 9–13, 2019, San Juan, PR, USA.
ACM,NewYork, NY, USA, 16 pages. https://doi.org/10.1145/3359789.
3359828
1 INTRODUCTION
Many Android apps commonly use password authentica-
tion protocols to verify user identity (i.e., authenticating the
user with the combination of the username and a static pass-
word [29]). However, in recent years, many security breaches
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led to large-scale password leakage1. Moreover, users usually
choose weak passwords (e.g., the infamous “123456”) because
a secure password is often too complex to remember. Because
of such issues, a single password authentication becomes
vulnerable to attacks such as brute force or dictionary based
search, and thus is not suitable for user login protection.
To address the above security issues, one-time password
(OTP, also known as dynamic password) authentication is
used. Referred to as two-factor authentication, the enhanced
validation requires the user to provide both a static password
and a dynamic OTP. The OTP here is used to protect valida-
tion systems against typical attacks because attackers must
determine and consume each OTP before the legitimate user
can do so for each authentication session. Typically, an OTP
is generated through a security token or retrieved from the
server via a secure channel. For example, Google and Apple
use both static passwords set by users and dynamic pass-
words generated by mobile authenticators (e.g., the Google
Authenticator [20]). Another case is theCITI Bank app, which
requires both the static password and an additional dynamic
password generated by a portable security token [5, 21].
Designing a secure OTP authentication protocol is, how-
ever, challenging and error-prone [22]. The security of OTP
authentication is regulated by a number of RFC documents
and a secure OTP authenticationmust satisfy several security
requirements. A crucial requirement is how to generate and
deliver the OTP securely. For an Android app, it is often too
heavyweight and inconvenient to deploy a portable security
token or a mobile authenticator. Therefore, generating and
transferring OTP through the short message service (SMS)
becomes the most prevalent implementation2.
We observed that although several techniques have been
proposed to analyze designs and implementations of tradi-
tional password authentication in Android apps [6, 30, 48],
seldom studies considered SMS OTP authentications and
barely analyzed the implementation security of them. In
this paper, we focus on security requirements of the SMS
OTP authentication protocol (hereinafter, we refer it as OTP
authentication protocol) and conduct an empirical evalu-
ation of the security of user validation systems which im-
plement OTP authentication protocols. The purpose of our
study is two-fold: (1) investigating the OTP authentication
protocol in the Android ecosystem, and (2) identifying apps
which implement vulnerable OTP authentication. We focus
on Android apps because Android is the most widely used
mobile operating system [8] and a large number of Android
apps adopt OTP authentications.
1Massive breach leaks 773 million email addresses and 21 million
passwords https://www.cnet.com/news/massive-breach-leaks-773-million-
emails-21-million-passwords/
2https://www.quora.com/Why-do-companies-use-SMS-and-OTP-to-
verify-the-mobile-number-doesnt-one-suffice
Our goal is to check how well an OTP implementation
(including the server side and the app side) complies with
a set of OTP authentication protocol rules (hereinafter, it is
referred to as OTP rules), which we derive from the best
practices outlined in a number of RFCs 3. Since these rules
are recommended as the best practices for implement se-
cure OTP protocols, we propose a novel analysis system,
AUTH-EYE, which determines whether OTP implementations
violate our defined OTP rules. AUTH-EYE locates and exe-
cutes login via an app to trigger the relevant functionalities
in server’s validation system and then examines server be-
haviours (i.e., server requests and responses). Unlike previ-
ous code-based approaches using semantic executions and
code dependencies [49, 52], AUTH-EYE only relies on limited
app code information (i.e., class names and function names).
Moreover, since source code of remote servers is often not
available, AUTH-EYE treats each remote server as a black box
and thus only checks its authentication system by analyzing
the server responses.
We applied AUTH-EYE to assess 3,303 popular Android
apps, collected from the top 2 Android app markets: Google
Play and Tencent marketplaces. We observed that there are
three types of login schemes, only password authentication,
only OTP authentication, and two-factor authentication with
both password authentication and OTP authentication. Since
we only focus on OTP authentication in this paper, AUTH-EYE
found 544 apps implemented OTP authentication protocols
in total. For the apps with two-factor authentication, weman-
ually registered an account and filled in the corresponding
username and password in each app. Surprisingly, AUTH-EYE
detected that OTP authentication protocols in 536 (98.6%) out
of the 544 apps violate at least one of our defined OTP rules,
and only eight (1.4%) apps implement their OTP authenti-
cation protocols with all OTP rules satisfied. This indicates
that developers may not be aware of the OTP security recom-
mendations outlined in the RFCs, and AUTH-EYE can be used
to help them implement more secure OTP authentication
protocols.
Contributions: Our contributions are:
• We derived a set of OTP rules that developers should
follow to implement secure OTP authentication proto-
col. Those rules are summarized from RFC documents
and then used to check implementations of OTP au-
thentication protocols in remote servers.
• We proposed a novel analysis system, AUTH-EYE, to
automatically evaluate protocol implementations. In
particular, AUTH-EYE conducts an efficient code anal-
ysis to locate login Activities in apps, requiring only
3Protocols defined in RFC: RFC 4226 [35], RFC 2289 [22], RFC 6238 [36],
RFC 1750 [14] and RFC 4086 [15]
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limited semantic information. It also examines the re-
mote validation system by only analyzing the network
(and SMS) requests and responses rather than source
code on server sides.
• We tested 3,303 real-world Android appswith AUTH-EYE
and found 544 apps adopt OTP authentication, and
AUTH-EYE reported that a large notion of those apps
violates at least one of our defined OTP rules.
2 DEFINITIONS AND OTP RULES
In this section, we introduce the OTP authentication proto-
cols, and explain OTP rules for designing and implementing
OTP authentication protocols properly.
2.1 One-Time Password Authentication
Protocol
When a user account is created in OTP authentication pro-
tocols, the account is bound to the user by the possession
of some information specific to the user, such as a mobile
phone number or an email address. At login, an OTP is cre-
ated for the user who must correctly return it. Android apps
often use SMS OTP authentication, where the server gen-
erates a pseudo-random value as an OTP and sends it via
SMS to the mobile phone number in the user’s profile. Such a
pseudo-random value is shared only between the server and
the user owning the mobile phone. The user then submits
the received value to the server for authentication. The un-
predictable and unique nature of the pseudo-random value
prevents password replay attacks. Two algorithms (namely
HMAC-based OTP and time-based OTP) are widely used to
generate the one-time password.
2.1.1 HMAC-based One-Time Password (HOTP). The algo-
rithm of HMAC-based one-time password (HOTP) combines
an incrementing counter value (C) and a secret key (K) to
generate the one-time password. The OTP value generated
by the HOTP algorithm is defined as [35]:
value = HOTP(K ,C),
where HOTP is the function:
HOTP(K ,C) = Truncate(HMACH (K ,C)).
where H is a cryptographic hash function, and the output
of the hash function HMACH is truncated to a user-friendly
size.
An HOTP value with a short length is convenient, but
vulnerable to brute-force attacks. To address this problem,
RFC 4426 recommends two steps: 1) the maximum number of
possible attempts per login session should be set beforehand,
and 2) each failed attempt should introduce an additional
delay before a retry is permitted. RFC 4426 also suggests
that with these protective steps the length of an HOTP value
should be at least six digits.
2.1.2 Time-based One-Time Password (TOTP). The time-
based one-time password (TOTP) algorithm [36] is an exten-
sion of the HOTP algorithm, using elapsed time increments
instead of an event counter. Because of human and network
latency, the one-time password for each login session must
remain valid over a time interval (defined by the time step
parameter). Based on RFC 6238, the OTP value generated by
the TOTP algorithm is defined as:
value = HOTP(K ,CT )
where K is a secret key, and CT is an integer counting the
number of completed time steps between the initial counter
time T0 and the current Unix time. Given a time step Tx in
seconds, CT is calculated as:
CT =
(current unix time −T0)
Tx
Due to the network latency, the number of time steps (CT )
calculated by clients and servers may differ and so resulting
in different TOTP values. This problem can be addressed by
setting the OTP time stepTx to an acceptable size. The OTPs
generated anytime within a time step will be the same and
will allow the user to login successfully. However, depending
on when a login request is made, a server might reasonably
accept OTPs from earlier or later time steps. For example, if
an OTP is generated near the end of a time step, the user may
compute a counter based on the succeeding time step due to
latency. To take this into account, the servermay accept OTPs
computed from time steps +/-1 from its current time step. A
larger time step makes the OTP authentication protocol with
a TOTP value become more vulnerable because it offers an
attacker more time to guess the TOTP value and consume
the TOTP value before the valid user does. To balance the
security and the usability of this authentication scheme, RFC
6238 recommends setting the size of the time step to 30
seconds.
Furthermore, the server must ensure that sufficient time
has elapsed between generating successive TOTP values so
that the number of time steps (CT ) has changed.
2.2 Best Practices and Threats for OTP
In this subsection, we first summarize six OTP rules (i.e.,
rules for secure OTP implementation) according to RFC doc-
uments, and then discuss threats against OTP authentications
if one or more rules are violated.
2.2.1 OTP Rules. Several RFC documents such as RFC
4226 [35], RFC 2289 [22], RFC 6238 [36], RFC 1750 [14], and
RFC 4086 [15] regulate how to securely implement an OTP
authentication protocol. We conclude them as six OTP rules
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that developers are recommended to follow for a secure OTP
implementation.
R1: OTP Randomness–Use a random value as an OTP for
authentication.
The server needs a cryptographically strong pseudo-random
number generator to generate the OTP value for each lo-
gin session, as an attacker can exploit any detectable non-
randomness in the successive OTPs. Some poor pseudo-
random number generators can be identified from the se-
ries [14], or values in the sequence may appear periodically.
In the worst situation, an implementation of OTP authen-
tication may keep using a static value as the OTP for all
authentication sessions.
R2: OTP Length–Generate an OTP value with at least six
digits.
The official document RFC 4226 [35] points out that “the
value displayed on the tokenMUST be easily read and entered
by the user.”. It requires that the OTP value should also be
of reasonable length. Particularly, RFC 4226 indicates that
an OTP value of at least six digits could adequately reduce
the probability of a successful brute-force attack. In view of
both usability and security considerations, OTP values with
a length from six to eight digits achieve the required overall
performance.
R3:RetryAttempts–Set a limit on the number of validation
attempts allowed per login.
RFC 4226 [35] recommend a maximum number of possible
attempts for OTP validation. In particular, when the maxi-
mum number of attempts is reached, the server must lock
out the user’s account to defend against a brute-force attack.
R4: OTP Consumption–Only allow each OTP value to be
consumed once.
According to the definition of the OTP authentication pro-
tocol, each OTP should only be valid for one authentication
session.
R5: OTP Expiration–Reject expired OTP values generated
by the TOTP algorithm.
Referring to RFC 6238 [36], the OTP value generated in
the next time stepMUST be different. It represents that the
OTP value generated by the TOTP algorithm should only be
valid for a limited time.
R6: OTP Renewal Interval–OTP values generated by the
TOTP algorithm should be valid for at most 30 seconds.
Due to the network latency issue, RFC 6238 [36] recom-
mends that “A validation system SHOULD typically set a
policy for an acceptance OTP transmission delay window for
validation.”; thus, a renewal interval is allowed. For the re-
newal interval, the login validation system achieves a higher
usability by allowing for a longer latency, potentially caused
by human and network operations. To balance the demands
of usability and security, RFC 6238 suggests that the OTP
should be renewed every 30 seconds.
2.2.2 Threats against OTP Authentication. We determine
whether an implementation of the OTP authentication pro-
tocol is secure, in that it should at least meet the following
two requirements:
(1) The authentication protocol should not be vulnerable
to brute force attacks.
(2) The authentication protocol should be secure against
replay attacks.
We observe that if one or more defined OTP rules are
violated, the above two requirements may not be satisfied.
In the following, we discuss how the violation of our defined
OTP rules threats the security of OTP authentication.
• The violation of R1 indicates that an OTP becomes pre-
dictable, and thus the validation systems are vulnerable
to replay attacks, allowing attackers to impersonate
legitimate users.
• The violation of R2 indicates that an OTP is of limited
length, which is vulnerable to brute-force attacks and
may be cracked within a few minutes [11].
• The violation of R3 indicates that an attacker could
easily guess the OTP value through a brute-force attack
if unlimited attempts are allowed.
• The violation of R4 indicates that a validation system
allows an OTP to be used multiple times and thus is
vulnerable to replay attacks.
• The violation of R5 indicates that a validation system
accepts an expired OTP value and thus allows an un-
limited time for an attacker to discover the OTP and
consume it before the legitimate user does.
• The violation of R6 indicates that a validation system
provides a long time window for an attacker to crack
the OTP.
Moreover, we observe that even though the violation of
a single rule might not cause severe security issues, power-
ful attacks could be launched if multiple rules are violated
simultaneously:
(1) Violation of R1 and any of the other rules. A static
OTP value is always vulnerable to replay attacks.
(2) Violation of R2 and R3. For an OTP value with length
less than six, an attacker can easily crack the OTP
value if the number of validation attempts is unlimited
(i.e., vulnerable to brute force attacks).
(3) Violation of R2 and R4. The violation of R4 allows an
attack to reuse current OTP values to launch replay at-
tacks. At the same time, if R2 is also violated, attackers
can easily extract OTP values for further attacks.
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(4) Violation of R4 and R5. The OTP validation system
is vulnerable to replay attacks by allowing an OTP to
be used multiple times. In addition, if the validation
system does not set OTP expiration, an attacker is
able to launch replay attacks by providing the same
OTP value. Even though an OTP is encrypted, the
attacker can request for verification by submitting the
encrypted format directly.
(5) Violation of R2,R3, andR6. Similar to situation (2), an
OTP validation with a larger renewal interval provides
an attack enough time to crack an OTP with less than
six digits. It is vulnerable to brute force attacks.
3 OTP AUTHENTICATION IN ANDROID
Analyzing OTP authentication protocols implemented in
real-world servers require addressing several challenges. Be-
low, we describe the challenges, each followed by our ap-
proach to address it.
Challenge 1: How to identify OTP authentication im-
plementations that violation the aforementionedOTP
rules without access to the source code? Static code anal-
ysis is the most popular technique to locate implementation
flaws. However, this technique does not work because server
source code is not publicly available. The other technique is
to identify functionalities supported by servers and interact
with servers. Many attack-based techniques have been pro-
posed based on this approach [25] [27]. However, we cannot
apply this approach in our case for ethical reasons.
Our approach 1: Interacting with servers.We search for
implementation violations via legitimate interactions with
servers. Executing an app triggers the validation functional-
ities of OTP authentication implemented in the app server.
Referring to the OTP rules defined in Section 2, we design ex-
periments to test the functionalities and determine whether
the implemented OTP authentication protocol obeys all the
OTP rules.
Challenge 2: How to locate the app code that triggers
the validation functionalities of OTP authentication?
We perform login by executing Android apps to explore
the functionalities of OTP authentication at remote servers.
Hence, we need to locate OTP login Activities in apps. To
find such Activities, we decompile each app and search for
functions declaring login Activities. However, developers
use a variety of names for these functions, which makes
identification more complicated. While we can recognize the
login functions by matching data- and control-dependencies
with execution patterns, such a strategy does not always
succeed because the code decompilation of an app may be
incomplete. Thus, we need a broader approach to identify
login functions that requires less code information.
Our approach 2: Recognizing OTP login functions se-
mantically. Login Activity declarations, including class in-
formation (i.e., class name and name of the extended class)
and function information (i.e., function name and argument
name) are more complete than other relevant information,
such as control-dependencies and API names. Moreover, lo-
gin Activity declarations reflect which functionalities are
included in the class. Although name recognition is chal-
lenging, we observe that developers prefer to use similar
words to name similar functionalities. This provides a way
to identify login-related functions by applying syntax and
lexical analysis.
Challenge 3: How to perform login Activities to inter-
act with each server? Once the login Activity declarations
are located, we send login requests via the login Activity
in each app, triggering the OTP validation system at the
remote server. We can manually send login requests, but it
does not scale to a large number of apps. To automate the
process, we need to design a system that follows the login
process precisely. Otherwise, irrelevant services might be
triggered, which cause unexpected errors. For example, a
button requesting a password reset might be clicked acci-
dentally, possibly switching from the current login page to a
password reset page.
Our approach 3: Extracting the position of each wid-
get. After app decompilation, there is a file describing all
the involved widgets, including their names, layouts, types,
positions, etc. The widget type information helps to identify
the widgets used for editing texts and clicking buttons. The
widget name implies its purpose, and its layout gives its po-
sition. Through this information we can locate the required
widgets precisely and execute further operations.
Challenge 4: How to parse the received server mes-
sages? Responses from a server are texts containing both
useful information (e.g., valid OTP, its expiration, etc.) and
irrelevant material. Furthermore, OTP authentication pro-
tocols implemented in different servers have different func-
tionalities, which indicates that their responses differ. To
deal with this issue, we need a mechanism to systematically
process these server messages and recognize the fields con-
taining the useful information.
Our approach 4: Examining altered fields in each mes-
sage.We identify fields that are altered by comparing multi-
ple responses. Although OTP authentication protocols with
different functionalities may give different responses, some
essential fields in these responses still follow particular for-
mats. For example, the description of OTP expiration is usu-
ally in the format of a decimal followed by a string as “sec-
ond(s)”, “minute(s)” or “hour(s)”. With some prior informa-
tion like this, we discover the used formats and furthermore
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find what functionality is implemented by sending multiple
requests to the same server.
4 SYSTEM DESIGN: AUTH-EYE
This section describes our automated system, AUTH-EYE,
which analyzes Android apps and detects violations of the
OTP rules defined in Section 2. AUTH-EYE is built following
the approaches outlined in Section 3 to address the critical
challenges while examining OTP protocol implementations.
AUTH-EYE comprises two components: a Login Code Detec-
tor and anAuthMessageAnalyzer, and Figure 1 illustrates
the system workflow. We next describe the system in detail.
4.1 Login Code Detector
As mentioned earlier, our focus is on the SMS OTP authenti-
cation protocol. The function of the login code detector is to
analyze a set of apps and generate anOTP List of the apps that
implement SMS OTP login activities. AUTH-EYE achieves this
in two steps: app decompilation and Login Activity locating,
which are detailed as follows.
4.1.1 App Decompilation. AUTH-EYE is built on top of the
JEB Android decompiler [42]. The login code detector first
takes apps as inputs and uses JEB to decompile them into
their java source code.
4.1.2 Login Activity Locating. Since AUTH-EYE only fo-
cuses on OTP authentication, it first needs to distinguish Ac-
tivities of OTP authentication from that of password authen-
tication. However, since both Activities are named similarly
in layout files, it is hard for AUTH-EYE to distinguish OTP
authentication via the layout files only. Therefore, AUTH-EYE
examines the java source code of each app to identify those
which implement login activities. AUTH-EYE first looks for
Activities that were declared by developers (i.e., customized
classes and functions) and then identifies functions that ful-
fill login Activities. The examination steps of how AUTH-EYE
recognizes OTP login Activities in apps are detailed below.
Customized Package Selection. We observe that Activi-
ties commonly exist in customized packages (i.e., declared by
developers) and seldom exist in third-party libraries. There-
fore, AUTH-EYE needs to distinguish customized packages
from the standard packages declared in third-party libraries.
AUTH-EYE adopts a heuristic approach to achieve this target:
it ONLY collects class names of Activities in an app and ana-
lyzes the first two fields in a class name. For example, in the
class name cx.itxxx.usercenter.activity4, the first two
fields, cn.itxxx, indicate the identity of the developer, while
the last part, usercenter.activity, refers to the functions
that are related to an Activity. In one app there often exist
many Activities. AUTH-EYE defines the most frequently ap-
peared first-two-fields prefix as the developer’s information,
and then deems packages with this developer’s information
as customized packages. According to our manual inspection
on 2,210 popular Android apps, 2,153 apps follow this pat-
tern and thus AUTH-EYE could apply this approach to locate
customized packages.
Login Function Identification.Once the customized pack-
ages are identified, AUTH-EYE locates classes and functions
with login Activities. A common strategy for understanding
a function semantically is to search for specific words and
dependency patterns. However, in our case this strategy fails
to extract semantic information effectively for the following
reasons:
• Non-Uniform Representation: Developers often choose
function and variable names arbitrarily. They often use
different names for functions and variables with the
same purpose, such as the AccountLoginActivity
login functions and PhoneLogin. For a matching ap-
proach to succeed, we thus need a dataset with a large
number of potential keywords.
• Vague Explanation:Developersmay use identical words
but combine these words in different orders to name
different functions. The meanings of these functions
are significantly different. This makes a simple key-
word comparison inaccurate. For example, the func-
tion LoginPhoneAct refers to the activity of extracting
phone settings, but PhoneLoginAct specifies login via
mobile phone.
• Unclear Expression: Developers often use abbreviations
and colloquial terms (e.g., AccountAct) to declare an
Activity. Moreover, the decompilation replaces some
4We used ‘x’ to conceal the details of this developer
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APIs by using abstract formats, e.g., UserLogin.a. Ab-
breviations and abstract formats like this are more
difficult to recognize through a simple keyword match-
ing.
• Partial Decompilation: We cannot completely decom-
pile apps with protected code snippets. Hence, the
patterns extracted through the data and control depen-
dencies may be inadequate.
To gain a further understanding of these difficulties, we
manually inspected the source code of each app. We found
that class names are usually fully decompiled, and follow
some specific formats. For example, developers use similar
words (e.g., login, auth) with similar formats to name a
login Activity. Therefore, we propose a natural language
processing [33] (NLP) based approach, which is widely used
to evaluate the semantic similarity between a pair of words,
to extract the semantic information from class and function
names and so address the second challenge.
We first manually construct a reference set for similarity
comparison. We collected the login-related class names and
function names from 4,665 repositories posted on Github5,
where open source apps display the code with loginActivities.
A context is required for measuring the semantic similarity
between an unknown name and names in the reference set.
Because we compare the semantic similarity of two words
defined in programming code, text corpora such asWikipedia
and Google Book Ngram Corpus are not appropriate. Instead,
we generated our own code corpus by using all posts on Stack-
Overflow.To compare an unknown name with names in the
reference set, AUTH-EYE converts the words in code corpus
into sets of vectors by using Word2vec [34] and computes a
cosine distance between the unknown name and each name
in the reference set. The cosine distance between two words
gives a measure of their semantic similarity, where a greater
cosine distance represents a higher semantic similarity. Us-
ing the reference set, AUTH-EYE proceeds according to the
following steps to identify functions related to login Activi-
ties:
(1) AUTH-EYE splits each name into several words based
on the occurrence of uppercase letters to improve the
accuracy of a comparison between an unknown name
and names in the reference set. We assume the stan-
dard programming practice in which the names of
classes and functions are usually a combination of sev-
eral words, capitalized at word boundaries.
(2) AUTH-EYE compares each word with the names in the
reference set and computes the corresponding simi-
larity scores. The highest score found for the word is
taken as its similarity score.
5Repositories on Github: https://github.com/search?q=Login+Android
(3) AUTH-EYE calculates the semantic similarity by taking
the average similarity of all words in the name. If the
average similarity score is higher than a threshold, the
corresponding class name is labeled as a “login”.
(4) AUTH-EYE runs steps (1) - (3) iteratively to distinguish
“login” classes and then repeats the three steps to label
“login” functions in these classes.
For example, consider the function name doLogin. The
highest semantic similarity score is 0.43 if AUTH-EYE com-
pares the entire name with each word in the reference set. If
the name is divided into single words as “do” and “Login”,
its average semantic similarity is 0.66 as the similarity scores
for two words are 0.33 and 0.98, respectively.
SMS OTP Identification. AUTH-EYE examines the identi-
fied login function to determine whether its functionality is
SMS OTP login.
Even though the java code for each app may be only par-
tially decompiled, the layout XML file can be fully extracted.
Therefore, AUTH-EYE identifies the apps implementing SMS
OTP login Activities by analyzing the layout XML files in-
stead of analyzing the login function code. For each identified
login function, AUTH-EYE uses UI Automator [1] to find the
name of the corresponding layout XML file from the “pub-
lic.xml” file. In the layout XML file, UI Automator parses all
the information describing each widget, such as type, text,
orientation, and position (i.e., its layout).
Differently from the case with function declarations, we
find that each widget is named formally. Thus, we manually
collected a set of keywords (e.g., “smscode” and “mobile-
phone”) from 13 repositories posted on Github [9]6 to con-
struct a keyword list. In order to identify whether a widget is
related to SMS OTP login, AUTH-EYE chooses the widgets for
edit text and button. For each widget, AUTH-EYE compares
the text in the field of android:text with the words in the
keyword list. If any keyword is included in the widget text
field, an SMS OTP login is identified, which indicates that
its server validates the user’s identity through the OTP au-
thentication protocol. AUTH-EYE finally generates an OTP
list containing those apps that are identified using SMS OTP
login. The widget descriptions, that are relevant to SMS OTP
login, are also included.
4.2 Auth Message Analyzer
Taking the OTP app list as an input, the Auth message
analyzer of AUTH-EYE then executes OTP login Activities
through each listed app to interact with its server. By examin-
ing server responses and checking the OTP values, AUTH-EYE
determines whether the implemented OTP authentication
protocol violates any of the OTP rules.
613 repositories onGithub: https://github.com/search?q=OTP+Login+Android
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4.2.1 OTP Login Execution. AUTH-EYE utilizesMonkey tool,
an UI/Application Exerciser [2], which triggers SMS OTP
login Activities by generating pseudo-random streams of
user events (e.g., clicks and button touches). However, the
executions of Monkey are somewhat imprecise so that some
redundant Activities may be performed accidentally, causing
unexpected errors. To improve the efficiency and effective-
ness of the automated OTP login testing, AUTH-EYE makes
use of the orientation information parsed by UI Automator to
precisely locate the widgets (i.e., edit text and button) that
are related to SMS OTP login Activities.
To execute a login Activity, AUTH-EYE calls the function
dispatchString() to enter a valid mobile phone number
into the edit text widget. It then clicks the button to send
the mobile phone number to the server, requesting a pseudo-
random OTP value. The server response is a text message
containing the OTP value and some textual descriptions.
AUTH-EYE needs to accurately extract the OTP value in this
message (note that AUTH-EYE has been given root permission
for the tested Android phone in advance to extract the SMS
messages from database /data/data/android.providers.
telephony/databases/mmssms.db). We thus manually an-
alyzed response messages generated by executing the SMS
OTP login in 200 apps and found that the messages with
OTPs followed formal formats. Therefore, we created a list
of keywords that describe OTP values such as “password”,
“OTP”. In detail, AUTH-EYE applies a keyword matching to
parse each responsemessage. Given the keywords, AUTH-EYE
extracts the OTP value from each message in the following
steps:
(1) AUTH-EYE pre-processes a response message by apply-
ing Porter Stemmer [32, 41] to convert words to their
root forms. For example, the root form of “time” and
“times” is “time”.
(2) AUTH-EYE divides themessage into several blocks based
on the text spaces. Each block contains a numeric value
or a word.
(3) AUTH-EYE searches for the block whose word matches
any of the predefined keywords. If a match is found,
AUTH-EYE selects the content in the subsequent nu-
meric block as the OTP value.
An interesting observation is that many Android apps
nowadays ONLY use OTP authentication and do not adopt a
password authentication. In this situation AUTH-EYE could
easily conduct the test without considering the password
login issue. For those apps with a two-factor authentica-
tion (i.e., a login requires both the password and the OTP),
AUTH-EYE relies on a manual account registration and login
as the prerequisite to conduct the following evaluation.
4.2.2 Evaluating Rule Violations. AUTH-EYE executes the
following tests to check each app’s compliance with the OTP
rules.
R1: OTP Randomness. To assess the randomness of the
pseudo-random values generated by a server for each au-
thentication session, AUTH-EYE sends 30 OTP requests to
each server and parses the response messages to extract a
sequence of OTPs for each server.
AUTH-EYE proceeds in two ways to generate the value se-
quences for examination. In the first, AUTH-EYE consumes
each received OTP before sending a new login request. In the
second, AUTH-EYE sends login requests without consuming
the values for OTP authentication. From the sequence of
OTPs, AUTH-EYE evaluates the randomness from the follow-
ing two perspectives:
• Repetition: AUTH-EYE identifieswhether a subsequence
appears periodically in the sequence, or the same value
appears repeatedly in the sequence.
• Static: AUTH-EYE examines the sequence with constant
values.
We observed some apps reject repeated requests when
certain numbers of request are reached, and so prevent ac-
quisition of the 30 values required. In such cases, we wait
until the validation works again before re-starting the test.
Most apps only block the account for around 10 minutes,
and rarely for one hour. Only a few apps block the account
for as long as 24 hours.
It is important to mention that if the value sequence passes
the above checks, it can only be regarded as potentially ran-
dom. In this study, we did not test the values in the sequence
using more rigorous tests for randomness because that re-
quires a larger number of OTPs. Due to the constraints set in
each validation system, collecting a sufficiently large number
of OTPs is time-consuming, and even perhaps impossible in
practice.
R2: OTP Length. AUTH-EYE checks the length of each OTP,
which should be at least six digits. If a server generates an
OTP with length less than six digits, AUTH-EYE labels the
corresponding app as vulnerable.
R3: Retry Attempts. As the number of allowed attempts
is not suggested by RFCs, we consider apps that allow more
than five attempts to be insecure. AUTH-EYE first requests
a valid OTP from the server to test this property. It then
generates a fake OTP by using ‘0’ to replace all the digits in
the valid OTP (or using ‘1’ if the valid OTP happen to be all-
zeros). The fake OTP value is used for testing the existence of
a retry limit. AUTH-EYE then submits the incorrect value five
times and analyzes the five responses sent back from servers.
Since the error message is not shown as an SMS message,
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AUTH-EYE relies on Burp Suite [38] to collect responses from
each server and store them in a log file for further parsing.
To identify the limitation on retry attempts, AUTH-EYE
compares the five error messages without considering the
values in the messages. If the five messages are identical, it
implies that the validation system may not limit the num-
ber of attempts. In that case AUTH-EYE sends the fake value
repeatedly to confirm whether there is any limit. AUTH-EYE
terminates this procedure under two circumstances: 1) a dif-
ferent message is received, such as “Too many errors”, or
2) AUTH-EYE has made 20 attempts7. The first circumstance
implies that there is a limitation, and the number of attempts
so far performed by AUTH-EYE is the maximum allowed at-
tempts. The second case indicates that the validation system
may allow unlimited attempts.
If the five error messages are not the same, AUTH-EYE then
identifies the word describing attempts from these messages.
AUTH-EYE searches for the format as a value followed by
the word “time”, which refers to how many more attempts
may be made. Setting a time delay is a possible additional
protection mechanism for retry attempts. Given the five
error messages, AUTH-EYE first searches for the word “delay”
and then finds the format as a value followed by a time-
related word (i.e., “second/s”, “minute/min”, or “hour/h”).
The value found is extracted as the required delay before
another attempt.
R4: OTP Consumption. To identify whether the valida-
tion system of OTP authentication accepts a re-used OTP,
AUTH-EYE first requests and consumes a valid OTP. It then
attempts the consumed OTP again. If the validation succeeds
for the second time, it indicates that the implemented OTP
authentication does not check or remember the provided
OTP for each authentication session, and permits repeated
use of OTPs across multiple sessions.
R5: OTP Expiration. Given response messages, AUTH-EYE
searches for the word “expire” and extracts the value after
this word, that is, the validation time of the received OTP. To
measure the expiration interval, we set a timer in AUTH-EYE.
Once the OTP message is received, AUTH-EYE starts the timer
and repeatedly sends the OTP to the server for validation
until it expires. If AUTH-EYE can be validated successfully,
a violation is detected (i.e., the server does not check the
expiration of the OTP adequately).
R6: OTP Renewal Interval. To identify apps that violate
this rule, AUTH-EYE provides a valid OTP at times correspond-
ing to different time intervals. Because the RFC recommends
7We choose 20 attempts after considering the potential legal issue in main-
land China. Also, we can easily add the guess times to determine which
apps are actually vulnerable.
30 sec as the optimal time interval, we set the time inter-
vals to [0, 30s], [30s, 60s], [60s, ∞]. In our test, AUTH-EYE
first uploads the OTP immediately after it was received (i.e.,
within 30 seconds). Then, AUTH-EYE requests a new OTP and
submits the value within 30 to 60 seconds. If the request
succeeds, AUTH-EYE asks for another OTP value and resub-
mits it after 60 seconds. AUTH-EYE repeats this test with the
renewal intervals of [1min, 5min], [5min, 10min], [10min,
30min], [30min, 60min], [60min, 24h], and [24h,∞] until it
is rejected by the server (or finds a still available OTP after
24 hours). If a server accepts an OTP with a lifetime more
than 30 seconds, AUTH-EYE considers it as an insecure one.
5 EVALUATION
Our evaluation has two goals. The first is to assess the ef-
fectiveness of AUTH-EYE in automatically analyzing the im-
plementations of OTP authentication protocols in Android
apps and verify that their implementations comply with the
OTP rules. The second is to use AUTH-EYE to gain insights
into the frequency of violations of OTP rules in real-world
Android apps.
5.1 Dataset
We built our app dataset by downloading 3,303 top list apps
from both Google Play and Tencent MyApp markets (986 from
Google Play and 2,317 from Tencent) between February and
April 2019. The dataset contains apps in 21 categories includ-
ing Beauty, Books & Reference, Communication, Education,
Entertainment, Finance, Health & Fitness, Lifestyle, Map &
Navigation, Medical, Music & Audio, News & Magazine, Par-
enting, Personalization, Photography, Productivity, Shopping,
Social, Tool, Travel & Local, Video Players & Editors. We se-
lected from each category the recommended apps (about 150
apps in each category, and the most active one has around 3
billion downloads).
We observed that many apps also provide the option of
login via a third party (e.g., OAuth). Note that in this paper
we only assess apps with customized OTP authentication
protocols, and those which use third-party authentication
services with open-authentication are out of the scope of
this paper.
5.2 OTP Login Activity Recognition
The first task of AUTH-EYE is to create an OTP list, i.e., a
list of apps implementing SMS OTP. Among the the 3,303
apps in our dataset, AUTH-EYE is able to analyzed 1,364 apps,
while other apps adopt app protection measures (e.g., code
packing and code obfuscation) to hinder the decompilation
and code analysis of AUTH-EYE. We manually inspected the
apps that AUTH-EYE failed to analyze to gain some insights:
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Table 1: Top-10 login activity names in apps
Login Activity Names # of apps
Login 105
LoginSuccess 53
doLogin 37
smsLogin 18
onLoginSuccess 16
startLogin 14
requestLogin 14
startLoginActivity 13
supportSmsLogin 13
serverBindLoginRequest 13
• 648 apps are protected using code packing against de-
compilation, in which their “.class” files are encrypted.
These files will only be decrypted during app execu-
tion. Since we cannot extract the source code from
encrypted apps, AUTH-EYE is unable to locate their lo-
gin Activities and cannot execute them.
• AUTH-EYE are not able to analyze 1291 apps because 1)
695 of them use code obfuscation to prevent the code
from being analyzed and 2) 596 apps are unable to be
executed due to potential anti-debugging code.
We argue that AUTH-EYE could also adopt advanced anal-
ysis technique such as unpacking to handle these issues,
but this often involves manual efforts (e.g., patching anti-
debugging code) and is not scalable. More importantly, we ob-
serve that apps developed by large companies (e.g., Microsoft,
Alibaba, Tencent, Baidu) seldom adopt code protection due
to stability and compatibility requirements. Therefore we
leave the analysis of protected apps as a future work and
only focus on those unprotected apps.
AUTH-EYE identified 1069 (78.3%) with declared login Ac-
tivities in successfully analyzed 1,364 apps, and the top-10
commonly used login Activity names are listed in Table 1.
It is clear from the list that developers do prefer to use the
word “login” to describe a login Activity. Given the list of
apps with identified login Activities, AUTH-EYE then further
identified how many implement OTP authentication. In to-
tal, 544 (58.2%) app adopt OTP authentication. Among these
544 apps, 354 use two-factor authentication (both password
authentication and OTP authentication), while 190 apps only
contain OTP authentication. In this study, we only discuss
the validation OTP authentication and leave the evaluation
of password authentication protocols as future work. Hence,
our discussion focuses only on the apps in the OTP list, i.e.,
544 apps implementing SMS OTP authentication. Note that
for apps with password authentication involved, we manu-
ally registered an accounts in those apps and typed in the
combination of username and password.
5.3 Results
5.3.1 Rules Violations. Table 2 lists the number of apps
that violate the OTP rules (see Section 2). Only eight apps
out of the 544 apps did not violate any of the OTP rules. We
now discuss the detected violations of OTP rules in the order
of their prevalence.
Table 2: Violations of OTP rules
OTP Rules # of apps
R6: OTP Renewal Interval 536
R3: Retry Attempts 324
R2: OTP Length 209
R4: OTP Consumption 106
R1: OTP Randomness 71
R5: OTP Expiration 40
R6: OTP Renewal Interval. A large number of apps, 536
in total, violated this rule, making it the most frequently
violated OTP rule. Only eight apps follow the requirement
proposed byR6. Further inspection revealed that in 165 apps,
the OTP validation systems did not require OTP values to
be renewed. For the remaining failed apps (i.e., 371 apps),
the intervals to renew OTP values set by their validation
systems are shown in Figure 2. Most validation systems (122
apps) are set to renew OTP values at intervals between 5
minutes to 10 minutes. The validation systems of 112 apps
generate new OTP values within the time interval of one
minute to five minutes. Even worse, AUTH-EYE identified
that the validation systems in 15 apps accept OTPs that have
been delayed for 24 hours. This design results in the TOTP
authentication protocol behaving no better than a normal
OTP authentication protocol. The developers of these apps
might deliberately choose this option since accepting a large
range of delays as valid is much more user-friendly.
R3: Retry Attempts. This rule limits the number of retry
attempts allowed by validation systems. It is the second most
violated OTP rule. AUTH-EYE identified 324 (59.6%) apps out
of 544 apps violating this rule, i.e., allowing more than five
attempts.
Figure 3 shows the number of attempts allowed by valida-
tion systems. Only 220 (40.44%) apps have OTP validation
systems complying with the rule, and most of these apps
(77.2%) are from the category of Shopping and a few are from
the Social category.
For the other apps that violate R3 (i.e., 324 apps), 111
apps allow 6 to 10 retry attempts, and 31 apps allow 11 to
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20 attempts. Because AUTH-EYE was set to send a fake OTP
at most 20 times for each app, it identified that the OTP
validation systems in 126 apps still work after 20 times of
retry. We surmised that these validation systems may not
implement any limitation and are thus vulnerable to brute
force attacks.
Additionally, AUTH-EYE identified the delay protection im-
plemented in the OTP validation systems of 97 apps. In these
apps, the user has to wait for a specific period if an incorrect
OTP value is entered. The waiting period set in these apps is
usually one minute.
R2: OTP Length. The thirdmost violated OTP rule is setting
the length of OTP values at fewer than six digits. As men-
tioned in Section 2, generating an OTP with short length
(i.e., length < 6) negates the security benefits of the OTP
authentication protocol.
In total, the validation systems in 209 apps use values with
less than six digits as OTP values. Although the OTP length
could be set at 10 digits, we discovered that all the validation
systems generate OTPs with at most six digits.
R4: OTP Consumption. This rule is violated by 106 apps
out of the 544 apps. Here, users are allowed to reuse an OTP
for identity verification. A unique value for each validation
session is essential in the OTP authentication protocol to
protect against replay attacks. Accepting a repeated OTP
value negates the benefit of using an OTP and can even make
the OTP authentication protocol weaker than a password
authentication protocol.
Apps violated this OTP rule are only from eight categories,
Shopping, Video Players & Editor, Books & Reference, Music
& Audio, Travel & Local, Entertainment and productivity.
37.7% vulnerable apps and 18.9% vulnerable apps are from
the categories of Books & Reference and Video Players &
Editor, respectively.
Figure 3: Number of retry attempts allowed in apps
R1: OTP Randomness. This rule was violated by 71 apps.
two types of errors are identified by AUTH-EYE: repeated
values and static values.
AUTH-EYE found 56 apps generating repeated OTP values.
To be specific, 21 apps generate a sequence of unique OTP
values and then repeat the same sequence. The validation
systems of 35 apps use the same OTP for n different requests,
that is, the same OTP value is repeated n times. Based on
our manual inspection, each value is repeated two or three
times (i.e., n = 2 or n = 3).
In addition, AUTH-EYE discovered that 15 apps provide
only static OTP values to users for OTP authentication. This
type of error makes the OTP authentication protocol per-
form as a simple password authentication protocol, in which
the username is the user’s mobile phone number and the
password is the fixed (short) OTP value. An attacker can then
easily access the user’s account if the mobile phone number
is leaked because the OTP value is shorter and simpler than
a static password set by the client.
The above results indicate that developers might not be
aware of the critical importance played by randomness in
authentication.
R5: OTP Expiration. AUTH-EYE identified 73 apps that use
TOTP authentication protocols, in which the OTP value may
expire. Interestingly, only 33 apps reject the OTP value if it is
expired, while the identity verification of 40 apps passed by
providing expired OTP values. This implies that the imple-
mented TOTP authentication protocols fail to work properly
in the corresponding servers.
For the remaining 471 apps, AUTH-EYE did not discover
any expiration set for OTP values by only analyzing the
responses. We might suppose that their validation systems
allow the OTP values to be valid forever.
We manually inspected those 1069 apps and found that
934 (87.4%) of them did implement login Activities. AUTH-EYE
mistakenly identified some apps because theirActivity names,
such as loginFail and thirdLogin, have higher semantic
similarity scores.
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Table 3: Violation of multiple OTP rules
# of apps multiple-rules violated
65 R2 & R4
13 R1 & (R2 or R3)
9 R4 & R5
2 R2 & R3
5.3.2 Results for Multiple-Rules Violations. We also in-
vestigated the status of multiple OTP rules violation in our
tested apps, and listed the cases that severely threat to the
security of OTP authentication in Table 3. As shown in the
table, the most frequently occurred situation is the violation
of both R2 and R4 (65 apps). In this situation, an attacker
could guess the OTP through a brute force attack, since the
number of legal OTPs is limited and the server also accept
a used OTP. Another common mistake is that 13 apps not
only used an immutable OTP, but also violate other rules
such as allowing an attack to guess the OTP, or always reuse
the immutable OTP if a legal user does not enforce a new
login request. There are also nine apps violate both R4 and
R5, and two apps violate R2 and R3 simultaneously. All
those apps that violate multiple OTP rules are considered
as highly vulnerable, and we have contacted the developers
and reported these issues.
Note that we found all “potential vulnerable” apps vio-
lated R6 (i.e., the valid time window exceeds 30 seconds).
Compared with a single rule violation, violations of both R6
and other rules will increase the risk. However, the violation
of R6 often does not directly lead to an attack. Therefore,
we do not consider this issue in our multiple rules violation
investigation.
5.4 Case Studies
This section aims to highlight insights from case studies
based on our manual inspections.
Matchless Functionality.We found some apps whose val-
idation systems do not match with the responses.
–Expiration. We investigated a game manager app with
more than 100,000 downloads. It transmits messages in se-
cure ciphertext formats and the server responses suggest that
authentication protocols (i.e., password authentication and
OTP authentication) are correctly implemented. However,
AUTH-EYE flagged this app because its validation system still
accepts “expired” OTPs. By parsing the server responses,
AUTH-EYE discovered that each OTP expired after 30 sec-
onds. However, when AUTH-EYE consumed each OTP after 1
minute and 10 minutes, it passed the validation. We agree
that remembering and validating OTP values for all login
requests consume a large amount of storage and memory
on the server side; but app security makes it essential to
implement an efficient reset method for clearing expired
values.
–Consumption. Users commonly use finance apps to man-
age their investments. It is crucial that financial information
is protected at all times. However, we found that the val-
idation systems in three financial apps accept previously
consumed OTPs. The OTP authentication of a financial app
was labeled by AUTH-EYE as vulnerable. By checking its re-
sponses, we found that this app violates almost all OTP rules
except for R1 (OTP Randomness) and R5 (Retry Attempts).
The only protection scheme implemented is that its valida-
tion system blocks the user’s account and does not generate
any OTP values if the user keeps sending requests more than
five times. While verifying user identity, this app not only
accepts consumed OTP values, but also transmits mobile
phone numbers and OTP values in plaintext. This means
that users’ private information (i.e., login information and
private data) is exposed to attackers.
Deceptive Randomness.Apps violatingR1 (OTP Random-
ness) are from the categories of Beauty, Finance, News &
Magazine, Photography and Video Players & Editors. The
percentage from each category with violations is 11%, 7%,
33%, 3%, and 46%, respectively. We investigated these apps in
details. For 6 of the 15 apps which generate static values for
OTP authentication, the OTP value is only renewed when
the previous one is consumed. The other apps keep sending
the same value to users.
Exposed Transmission. As well as analyzing server re-
sponses, AUTH-EYE monitored traffic messages to identify
whether an error occurred. From traffic messages, AUTH-EYE
identified that most messages containing OTP values are not
well-protected. The validation systems of 188 apps transmit
the OTP values in plaintext over the unsecured network. 36
apps protect OTP values by using only an MD5 hash without
salt, which is considered insecure [19]. With respect to mes-
sage transmission, we found that the most secure category is
Travel & Local, where 98.7% apps encrypt their transmitted
messages. The categories of Shopping and Social perform
the worst with only 72% and 74.6% apps being secure. We ob-
served that a Music app (10,070,000 downloads) only uses the
user’s mobile phone number as the password no matter what
user password and OTP are provided, and only the mobile
phone number is transmitted to the validation system.
5.5 Discussion
We have demonstrated through an experimental evaluation
that AUTH-EYE is effective in assessing the design and imple-
mentation of OTP authentication protocols in Android apps.
However, it has some drawbacks, outlined as follows.
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• DiscoveringVulnerabilities. AUTH-EYE executes each
app for SMS OTP validation and points out OTP rules
violated by the validation system. However, it is diffi-
cult for AUTH-EYE to discover what vulnerabilities exist
in the implementation and where they are located Con-
sider a case that violates R1 (i.e., OTP randomness).
Themost popular way of implementing this in Android
is to invoke the function SecureRandom(.), a pseudo-
random number generator. In practice, it should not be
seeded with a constant number; otherwise, the func-
tion will produce a predictable output sequence across
all implementations. However, some developers still
use seeds as “000000” or “123456” [31]. Such details
cannot be inferred in general by only analyzing the
server responses.
• Vulnerability Certainty. Currently, all the imple-
mentations that violate any of the OTP rules are tagged
as vulnerable. There might be other protection mecha-
nisms implemented in the validation system, beyond
those known to AUTH-EYE. For example, we discovered
that some Finance apps transmittedmobile phone num-
bers and OTPs in ciphertext or over a secure connect.
These protection schemes confirm that transmissions
are under secure circumstances, as long as the crypto-
graphic primitives or secure connection are correctly
implemented. This is, however, outside the scope of
this work.
• Black Box Analysis. AUTH-EYE treats the validation
system as a black box, and only analyzes server re-
sponses. We assume that such responses reflect func-
tionalities implemented in the code. However, this as-
sumption does not always hold as our manual inspec-
tions described in Section 5 found, such as in the case
of the Finance app discussed in Section 5.4. Based on a
given response, one may conclude that the implemen-
tation complies with the implementation rules, but
nevertheless functionalities defined in the validation
system may actually not be correctly implemented.
• Field Identification. AUTH-EYE identifies the required
information from the server responses through key-
words match only. Nonetheless, the formats of the re-
sponses are not always shown as the same. AUTH-EYE
might miss some responses in other format or identify
an incorrect information from the responses.
6 RELATEDWORK
This section provides a brief review of related work.
6.1 Security Analysis of One-Time
Password Authentication Protocols
Several vulnerability detection approaches and protection
schemes are proposed to defend against attacks on the steps
of protocols, e.g. transmission and password generation.
TrustOTP [44] builds a TrustZone to protect against attacks
such as Denial-of-Service (DoS). It isolates OTP code and
data from the mobile OS to ensure that the generated OTPs
and seeds are secure even if the mobile OS is compromised.
Differently, Hamdare et al. [23] and Eldefrawy et al. [16]
focused on securing the authentication during OTP trans-
mission and OTP generation, respectively. Hamdare et al.
proposed a scheme to protect the OTP mechanism used for
e-commerce transactions from Man-In-The-Middle (MITM)
attacks. Instead of transmitting a simple OTP, they combined
the OTP with a secure key and created a new transaction
password by encrypting the combination using RSA. Elde-
frawy et al. focused on securing OTP generation by generat-
ing multiple OTPs for both service providers and consumers.
The low computation cost of their scheme makes it suitable
for mobile devices.
The focus of previous work is to enhance the security of
OTP authentication protocols. However, we focused on ana-
lyzing the correctness of OTP implementations and proposed
an approach to check server responses instead of directly
performing code analysis. Mulliner et al.. [37] proposed a
similar research that conducted a survey by introducing sev-
eral attacks and weaknesses of SMS OTPs such as SIM swap
attack, wireless interception. To protect SMS OTP attacks,
the possible defense techniques are generally provided. How-
ever, details to exploit vulnerabilities and protect SMS OTP
authentication are not given. Dmitrienko et al. [12] inves-
tigated the implementation of two-factor authentication of
well-known Internet service providers (e.g., Google, Drop-
box, Twitter, and Facebook). They applied cross-platform
(i.e., PC-mobile) infection to control both PC and mobile
devices involved in the authentication protocol and identi-
fied weaknesses that could be exploited in the SMS-based
transaction authentication schemes of four large banks and
Google. Their approach determines whether an authentica-
tion implementation is secure, but cannot provide detailed
information on the causes. AUTH-EYE, however, does identify
the causes of implementation flaws.
6.2 Dynamic Vulnerability Analysis of
Mobile Apps
Several approaches have been proposed for dynamic analy-
sis of mobile apps. The approach by Zuo et al. [53] detects
vulnerabilities arising from SSL error handling in the mobile
platform. They statically identified customized error han-
dling processes rewritten by developers. For each process,
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their system executes an event to trigger the error and checks
whether the error is processed correctly. This approach re-
quires access to the source code. In contrast, AUTH-EYE as-
sumes that the server source code is not available, and uses
only decompiled Android app code.
D’Orazio et al. [13] relied on an adversary model spec-
ifying secure and insecure states to detect vulnerabilities
that can expose users’ sensitive data in mobile devices. The
drawback of their approach is that complete code coverage
cannot be ensured through app execution. AUTH-EYE instead
achieves full code coverage because the entire login activities
in apps are examined; thus, all the authentication relevant
functionalities can all be triggered. Also relying on an at-
tack scenario, IntentDroid [24] identifies Inter-Application
Communication (IAC) vulnerabilities by executing attacks
on eight specified vulnerabilities. It analyzes activity com-
ponents of apps by implementing attacks based on effect
path coverage, with low overhead. Although IntentDroid only
uses a small set of tests to achieve high coverage analyses,
path analysis mechanisms cannot be accurately applied to
decompiled app code.
AUTH-EYE is similar to SmartGen [52], which performs in-
context analysis to expose harmful URLs through symbolic
execution in mobile apps. Since server URLs are invisible,
SmartGen triggers the appropriate execution through APIs
in app code. The main difference between SmartGen and
AUTH-EYE is, however, that AUTH-EYE does not rely on de-
pendency patterns to identify the target functions. It uses
only limited code information (i.e., class names and func-
tion names) that are extracted easily and completely. Smart-
Gen targets on detecting of hidden malicious URLs whereas
AUTH-EYE identifies violations of the OTP rules in implemen-
tations of OTP authentication protocols.
7 CONCLUSION
In this paper we defined six OTP rules based on the relevant
RFCs and proposed a novel automated system, AUTH-EYE,
to check for violations of those rules. We used AUTH-EYE to
perform an empirical study on a large number of Android
applications. Our approach treats each server as a black box
and infers the correctness of its OTP implementation code
by analyzing server responses generated after a sequence of
login requests. We assessed 3,303 Android apps and identi-
fied 544 apps implemented OTP authentication. Only eight
of these 544 apps correctly implemented the OTP authen-
tication protocols (i.e., satisfied all six OTP rules). Further
analysis revealed the surprising fact that the validation sys-
tems of apps in security-critical domains, such as Finance,
Shopping, and Social, are not as secure as one might expect.
The example cases discussed in Section 5.4 show that poor
implementations make users’ accounts vulnerable to attack
and may even expose private data directly. As future work,
we plan to extend AUTH-EYE to examine additional OTP rules
and perform a more extensive survey of real-world app OTP
security. A new dynamic analysis tool, CuriousDroid [10], is
introduced. It is a context-based technique and can achieve
higher accuracy thanMonkey. We will refer to this technique
to improve AUTH-EYE. The interested readers could also ac-
cess our Github page8 to obtain source code of AUTH-EYE and
help improve the analysis.
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